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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the twenty-two states which have completely repudiated charitable
immunity,12 a trend universally applauded by writers in the field. 2
Barring legislative reversal, " Washington will presumably remain there.
Intentional Interference With Contractual Relationship-Mai-
cious Interference With Attorney-Client Relationship. The Wash-
ington Supreme court recently decided a case having personal as well
as professional interest to the legal profession. Plaintiff, an attorney,
was requested by a widow to make arrangements whereby she could
continue her deceased husband's business, and initiated probate of the
husband's estate. Defendants, tax consultants and certified public
accountants, were later retained by the widow to perform the estate's
tax work. At defendant's urging, the widow selected another attorney
from a list furnished by defendants and terminated plaintiff's employ-
ment. Plaintiff, upon inquiry, was informed by defendants that they
hired and fired attorneys for their clients. Plaintiff sued for damages
in the amount of his expectable attorney's fees, alleging that defendants
had intentionally interfered with his employment contract. On appeal
from a judgment for plaintiff, held: The defense of privilege is not
available to a third party who maliciously interferes with a contract
terminable at will. Calbom v. Knudtzon, 65 Wash. Dec.2d 137, 396
P.2d 148 (1964).
Intentional interference in the contract rights of others is an
actionable tort in Washington.' The tort consists of an intentional act,
committed with knowledge of the plaintiff's economic interest, which
interferes with an existing valid contractual relationship or business
expectancy of the plaintiff, and causes damage to the plaintiff.2 The
interference may be privileged, however, if its purpose is protection of
" See 2 HAiwun & JAMES, TORTS 1671 (1956) ; PROSSmE, TORTS § 127 at 1023 (3rd ed.
1964).
12 E.g., 2 H~aRa & JA _s, TORTS § 29.17; PROssER, TORTS § 127; Spencer, Ray v.
Tucson Medical Center: A Reappraisal of Tort Liability of Charities, 24 RocxY MT.
L. REV. 71 (1951).
:s See N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A :53A-7-11 (Supp. 1962); Collopy v. Newark Eye &
Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A2d 276 (1958); Peck, The Role of the Courts and
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. Rav. 265, 288 (1963).
1 Titus v. Tacoma Smeltermen's Union, 62 Wn.2d 461, 383 P.2d 504 (1963) ; Hein v.
Chrysler Corp., 45 Wn2d 586, 277 P.2d 504 (1954); Sears v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 8 Wn.2d 447, 112 P.2d 850 (1941) ; Porter v. King County Medical Society,
186 Wash. 410, 58 P2d 367 (1936); Pacific Typesetting Co. v. International Ty-
pographical Union, 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923); Seidell v. Taylor, 86 Wash.
645, 151 Pac. 41 (1915) ; Jones v. Leslie, 61 Wash. 107, 112 Pac. 81 (1910).
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 766 (1939). See 65 Wash. Dec2d at 142, 396 P2d at 151.
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a sufficient interest of the defendant, or of others.' Defendant has the
burden of proving that an alleged interference is privileged.'
In the principal case, defendants claimed that their interference
was justified by the privilege of responsibility for the welfare of another
and the privilege of giving requested advice, as set forth in sections
770 and 772 of the Restatement of Torts. Rejecting this claim, the
court stated with reference to privileges in general, "Such privileges,
however, do not justify officious, self-serving, or presumptuous as-
sumption of responsiblity and interference with the rights of others."'
Because the court approved the trial court's finding that "defendants'
interference was malicious, intentional and without justification," 6 it
followed that defendants' interference was unprivileged.
Although the finding of malicious, intentional interference would
appear to have settled the issue, the court proceeded to consider
whether defendants had met the burden of proof as to the alleged
privileges. To be consistent with its prior general statement, the court
should have stated that the issue of burden of proof was immaterial,
because malicious interference can never be privileged. Instead, the
court said:
We are satisfied, from our examination of the record, that defendants
have not sustained their burden of proof. Suffice it to say the evidence
supports the trial court's finding that defendant's interference was
malicious, intentional and without justification.T
Thus it appears that the court was unwilling to be explicit as to its
reason for denying the proffered defense of privilege, in light of plain-
tiff's proof of malicious intentional interference.
Plaintiff recovered damages in the amount of the fee he would have
received had he concluded probate of the estate, less compensation
3 E.g., Sunbeam Corp. v. Payless Drug Stores, 113 F. Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1953)(privilege to break restrictions violative of public policy); Braden v. Haas, Howell &
Dodd, 56 Ga. App. 342, 192 S.E. 508 (1937) (protection of a financial interest in the
promisor's business); Philadelphia Dairy Products, Inc., v. Quaker City Ice Cream
Co., 306 Pa. 164, 159 Atl. 3 (1932) (legitimate competition); Gregory v. Dealer's
Equip. Co., 156 Tenn. 273, 300 S.W. 563 (1927) (privilege of one responsible for the
welfare of another); Elvington v. Waccamaw Shingle Co., 191 N.C. 515, 132 S.E. 274(1926) (privilege to assert a bona fide claim); Coadey v. Degner, 191 Wis. 170, 210
N.W. 359 (1926) (privilege to advise on request); Macauley v. Tierney, 19 R.I. 255,
33 Atl. 1 (1895) (privilege to influence another's business policy). See RESTATEmEN,
TORTS §§ 768-74 (1939).
'Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904) ; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74
N.E. 603 (1905); RESTATmE NT, ToRTs §§ 766,777 (1939).
5 65 Wash. Dec.2d at 146, 396 P.2d at 153.
6 Id. at 146,396 P.2d at 154.7Id. at 146, 396 P.2d at 154-55.
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waived for services performed prior to termination of his contract.
Defendant asserted that this recovery should be further offset by the
value of time and expenses saved the plaintiff by his termination, as
in an action for breach of contract. The court rejected the contract
measure of damages as inapplicable to an intentional tort, but added:
"If defendants would offset the damages as claimed in the manner
asserted, the burden rested upon them to affirmatively allege and offer
proof upon such offset."8 This statement would suggest that savings
to an attorney of time and expense are deductible from his recovery
in an action for intentional interference. But an attorney's fee is
wholly composed of his time and expense; absent these items of re-
covery, an attorney would be limited to such items as damage to repu-
tation, loss of future earnings, and mental anguish. Despite the court's
recognition that "professional services... [comprehend] many intan-
gible values not wholly susceptible of proof,"9 the fact remains that
such damages would be extremely difficult to prove.
Regardless of the court's equivocal treatment of the issues of burden
of proof and measure of damages, the position of the court as regards
the integrity of the attorney-client relationship is clear. The decision
in the principal case can leave no doubt that third parties will not be
permitted to control the relationship between an attorney and his
client.
Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence as Proof of Libel Per Se.
The dubious distinction between libel per se and libel per quod may be
non-existent in Washington following a recent supreme court decision.
Plaintiff was divorced from his former wife, Hazel, on February 3,
1960. In September 1960, he married his present wife. Thereafter
plaintiff instituted a suit to modify the divorce decree. Defendant
newspaper, in reporting this suit, printed the following statement:
"Divorce Granted-Hazel M. Pitts from Phillip Pitts." Plaintiff sued
defendant for libel, alleging that considering extrinsic facts the publica-
tion was libelous per se; it gave the impression that plaintiff's second
marriage was illegal and that he was a bigamist. Defendant contended
that the publication was not libelous per se and that plaintiff could not
recover on the theory of a libel per quod since special damages had not
been pleaded. On appeal from a judgment for plaintiff in the court
below, held: False statements published in a newspaper concerning
81d. at 147, 396 P.2d at 154.
9 Id. at 147, 396 P.2d at 154.
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